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Rational Fear: The Effects of
Terrorist Activity and Immigration
on Attitudes toward Security in the
European Union
Matthew Easton and Connor Kreutz

Introduction: Immigration, Attacks, and Perceptions of Security in the EU

As soon as refugees fleeing ISIS and a Syrian civil war started streaming into Europe,
citizens began to consider the potential ramifications of accepting so many wayward
people from countries responsible for producing some of the world’s most deadly terrorists. Europeans most fearful of threats from terrorists and immigrants with other
criminal intentions began rallying around nationalist movements that campaigned
for stricter immigration laws in order to maintain the security of the European Union
(Pazzanese 2017). Nationalist candidates worked to garner support for stricter immigration policy by warning voters of the threats immigrants could pose to European safety
and stability (Einbender 2018). Politicians often accomplished this by asserting that terrorists pretended to be refugees in order to covertly enter countries they intend to target
(Pazzanese 2017). Such rhetoric was highly successful in building connections between
immigrants and terrorists in the minds of concerned citizens and helped elect nationalist
parties into the parliaments of many Western European nations.
This paper aims to explore the origins of these sentiments. Following an increase
in terrorist attacks, do attitudes toward security change? Using public opinion data
collected from ten countries in the EU, data on global terrorist activity from the Global
Terrorism Database, and immigration statistics from Eurostat’s national reporting, we
seek to determine if increased immigration and terrorist attacks drive public fear of refugee immigrants or if other forces are to blame for inciting fear among European citizens.

Existing Theories on Influences to Public Opinion

Citizens of nations that experience an influx of immigrants from foreign countries tend to report two types of concerns or fears. Some fear immigrants will threaten
36
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the existing economic system by seeking out scarce labor opportunities, thus increasing competition for high-demand jobs (Mayda 2004). Specifically, in Europe, expertly
skilled and highly educated Europeans are more likely to support weaker immigration laws, because they believe they are more qualified than the average immigrant
and need not fear being replaced (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007).
The second type of fear reported in response to a refugee influx is fear for national
and local security. Interestingly, previous literature has established that fear of this type
is more often connected to the nature of each individual citizen, not external circumstances. For example, the more self-transcendent an individual seems to be, the more
likely he or she is to support liberal immigration policies. The opposite is also true;
the more self-concerned an individual reports to be, the more likely they are to
oppose immigration (Davidov and Meuleman 2012). Individuals who are more
selfless are more likely to support immigration, even when it may pose security risks.
Does this mean, however, that citizens of countries with strict immigration laws are
selfish people? Not completely. Research on immigration phobia and security in
Europe and Russia suggests that, regardless of a citizen’s ideology, when probed
about issues of immigration in situations of uncertainty—such as during unemployment or in the wake of an election—their support for immigration decreases (Alexseev
2006). These types of changing and uncertain environments create situations where
citizens are more impressionable or susceptible to new ideas.
Reports of terrorist attacks, both domestic and foreign, can be similarly fear-inducing
for citizens of countries who may fear local aggressions or additional attacks abroad. For
example, previous research indicates that terrorist attacks carried out in foreign regions
such as Mumbai, India, succeeded in increasing general fear of terrorist attacks among
Western Europeans (Finseraas and Listhaug 2013). It is important to note, however, that
these attacks did not affect support or opposition of immigration policy (Finseraas
and Listhaug 2013). Domestic terrorist attacks seem to be even more effective in
instilling fear in a population than attacks abroad and do not need any sort of accompanying factor to increase their salience (Worrall 1999). Regardless of the location of
the terrorist attack, there seems to be a sort of terror-induced psychosis that permeates a society after an attack (Renard 2016). This psychosis entails expanded news
coverage about terrorism, increased fear for security in public, and enlarged fear of
people who resemble the perpetrators of the attack.
In many cases, perception of immigration and terrorism seem to effect each
other. People who embody different traits from the local population are often used
as scapegoats in the wake of a terrorist attack (Spencer 2008). Often, people who are
different are also depicted as people who are dangerous. Application of this theory can
be seen in the U.S. perception of terrorist migration from Canada and Mexico. While
there have been no known attacks in the U.S. from terrorists that migrated through
Mexico, there have been multiple attacks in the U.S. from Canadian-born terrorists.
However, when asked about areas of most concern, U.S. citizens report a far greater

fear of terrorist migration from or through Mexico than from Canada (Liken and
Brooke 2007). Further research between immigration and terrorism exposes a dispersion effect. This effect is evident in data suggesting that, while immigration does
contribute to the diffusion of terrorism, it does not lead to an increase in terrorism.
It instead appears to spread out terrorist attacks among more countries (Bove and
Boehmelt 2016).
Further research suggests that matters of immigration and terrorism become more
salient when framed by a political or social ideology that is particularly focused on foreigners. For example, citizens seem to report stronger opposition to immigration when
terrorist attacks occur but only when citizens see news articles and reports framing these
attacks in a fearful way (Gadarian 2010). Research on sentiments in the UK after terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid, and London suggests the politicization of
terrorism increases perceptions of terrorism as a threat to society (Mythen and Walklate
2006). This suggests that ideology acts as a catalyst for fear of terrorists and immigrants.
An individual’s political ideology seems to have a noticeable effect on how individuals react to immigration when triggered by some sort of fear-inducing terrorist attack
(Brooks et al. 2016). Center and far-right political groups often politicize immigration to
mobilize support for their causes by appealing to the fears of their constituents (Boswell
and Hough 2008). This appeal to fear takes many forms but can be seen most commonly in the party’s suggested policy, advertising, and rallies.
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A New Theory on the Effects of Immigration and Terrorism on Public
Opinion

Existing research, while thorough about how ideology, terrorist incidents, and
immigration all create fearful public opinion, leaves gaps where such findings are arguably most salient—when these events occur simultaneously. Additionally, there seems
to be geographic gaps in the existing literature. Western Europe has recently experienced greater immigration rates than nearly any other region, accompanied by
influxes in terrorist activity and a rise in nationalist parties, making it an ideal
region to study. Our analysis seeks to explore how increased immigration and
terrorist incidents, as well as political ideology, all play a role in increasing fear of
immigration among Western Europeans.
Given existing theory on the effects that immigration alone has on public opinion,
we theorize that an influx of immigrants and refugees into the EU from non-EU countries alone is not enough to incite fear that these immigrants will pose a security threat.
While such shocks to a nation may cause citizens to worry for their jobs, immigrants
alone are not threatening enough to make Europeans fear an increase of terrorist incidents or crime (Mayda 2004).
Similarly, we can build on previous theoretical frameworks dictating that
knowledge of terrorist attacks alone do not guarantee fear of immigrants among
Europeans, even if those attacks take place in the citizens’ native countries (Finseraas and Listhaug 2013). While Europeans are highly skeptical of opening their
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borders, they do not automatically link increased terrorist incidents with the notion
that incoming immigrants could threaten national security.
Previous literature does, however, clearly establish that immigration and terrorist incidents do seem to influence public opinion when the political ideology of
each individual being surveyed is taken into account. Center and far-right political
groups mobilize support for their policies by propagating anti-immigration rhetoric
intended to increase fear of immigrant-caused attacks that their protectionist policies
aim to prevent.
We theorize that increases in terrorist incidents and increased levels of immigration create a changing or uncertain environment for many Western Europeans. In
such an environment, anti-immigration ideologies from political groups that believe
immigration is a threat to their society are more relevant. When citizens are exposed
to these ideologies in an atmosphere of increased immigration and terrorist activity,
they develop greater fear and increased belief that immigration will decrease national
security and increase terrorist threats.

the most recent information Pew had to offer. With terrorism increasing in Europe
since the early 2000s, we felt that—despite this time discrepancy—we would still
find salient and valuable results. While there are many interesting features about
this data, the most important factor for choosing this particular data is the consistency of survey content. Pew Research asked the same questions to all respondents,
regardless of nationality, making cross-national comparisons much more simple and reliable. While there is significant data on public opinion for nearly every country in the
world, it is difficult to find questions that are directly comparable. As such, this dataset
proved more than sufficient to analyze public opinion both in the EU as a whole, as well
as within each member state.
The Pew Research data contained information on twelve of the twenty-eight EU
members. Although there was not full representation of all states, we felt this was
sufficient enough to measure the variance within the international organization. Furthermore, it was by far the largest cross-national dataset with directly comparable
outcome measures. As this data was collected before the Brexit movement in mid2016, we decided to keep the UK in the analysis.

Causal Mechanism
Based on the aforementioned theories, we suggest the following hypotheses:
1. Increases in immigration into the EU from non-EU countries alone will not
increase public fear of terrorist attacks by immigrants.
2. Likewise, increased occurrence of terrorist attacks within a country will not
increase public fear in that country of terrorist attacks by immigrants.
3. However, an increase in terrorist incidents and immigration, when accompanied by conservative ideological preferences, will result in greater public fear
of immigration as a threat to national security.

Data and Methodology: Managing a Multilevel Data Set

In order to best test for fluctuations in public opinion across the EU, we used data
from the 2016 Spring Global Attitudes and Trends Questionnaire collected by Pew
Research. This dataset includes respondents from nearly twenty countries across the
world and asked public opinion questions on topics ranging from the economy to cultural norms to public policy. Although the data is almost three years old, Pew Research
only releases opinion survey results after two years of collection; as such, this dataset was
40

Outcome Measures
To best answer our question, we looked at three separate survey questions:
1. Will Refugees Increase the Likelihood of Terrorism?
2. Is ISIS a Major Threat in Your Country?
3. Are Refugees a Major Threat in Your Country?
We chose the first question as our main outcome variable, because it asked
opinions on the relationship between immigration and terrorism. Although not all
immigrants are refugees (and, in some spheres, are considered completely different
categories), we still felt it accurately displayed the public’s feelings on immigration. The
European immigration crisis that began in 2013 was driven largely by refugees from
41
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the Middle East, and refugees are therefore an acceptable measure for our research
question. We chose the next two questions, “Is ISIS a Major Threat?” and “Are Refugees
a Major Threat?” as outcome variables, because they can measure public opinion on
terrorism and refugees (immigration) separately. If we found correlation in the first
question, we could test the same analysis on the other outcomes to see if it was opinions
on terrorism or refugees alone that caused the correlation.
Finally, to craft data that fully represented our hypotheses, we added the 2016 population of each country, the total number of non-EU immigrants in each country from 2013
to 2016, and the total number of terrorist incidents in each country from 2013 to 2016. The
first two variables were gathered from Eurostat, with the latter coming from the Global
Terrorism Database. We then took the cumulative number of immigrants and divided
it by the total population to create an immigration rate for each nation. In so doing, we
had the data needed to fully address how both variables impact EU public opinion on
immigration and terrorism.
To analyze our data, we took a multilevel model approach. Our data was organized in a hierarchical fashion, with individual survey responses nested within larger
country-variant variables including population and terrorist incidents. As such, a regular OLS regression was both insufficient and inaccurate in representing the analysis
of our data. Instead, we used a mixed-model approach, which not only controls for
fixed-effects between states but also allows for analysis of cross-level variables within
the data. By using a multilevel mixed-model regression for hierarchical data frames,
we could confidently run our statistical analysis on the 2016 Pew Research data.

Results: It’s All About the Politics

To begin our analysis, we first tested the relationship between immigration and
terrorist incidents. As Table 1 (below) shows, we found a positive relationship between
these variables; as immigration increases, so does the amount of terrorist activity. However, the correlation coefficient between the two was only 0.1235, indicating that this
relationship is weak at best. It is likely that there is correlation but not causation present
in the relationship.
Understanding the present correlation between immigration and incidents, we
then conducted a regression analysis on the relationship of these two variables with
our main outcome measure, public opinion on refugees increasing terrorism, along
with our additional outcomes of attitudes about the threat of ISIS and refugees. As
seen in Figure 1, the more immigration a country experiences, the less likely it is to
experience negative public opinion. However, this impact was substantively small
and only statistically significant in opinions on the threat of terrorism. According to
Model 1 in Table 1, a one percentage point increase in immigration rate only decreases
attitudes that terrorism is likely by 0.117 units—as it is a seven-point scale, this shift
is unlikely to make any true impact on opinion. Indeed, considering the largest immigration rate is less than 4 percent, even a one percentage point increase in immigration
is unrealistic, which in turn signals that any change in opinion is unlikely. The decrease
42

in opinion on ISIS (Model 2) is even smaller: A one percentage point increase in immigration rate leads to a statistically insignificant 0.000784 unit decrease in negative
opinion. This is most likely due to the universal lack of public support for ISIS; the
group is responsible for hundreds of civilian deaths across the EU; therefore, it is
not surprising to see a consistently high fear of ISIS across all countries. We do find
interesting results between the relationship of immigration and attitudes that refugees are a threat, as seen in Model 3 of Table 1. For a one percentage point increase
in immigration rate, we can expect a 0.291 decrease in negative opinion on refugees,
significant at the 99 percent level. This result correlates with previous research, as
it is no surprise that countries with higher immigration (and in turn higher refugee
influxes) also have higher interaction with refugees, causing more of the population
to view them as less threatening.

Table 1.

Regression Analysis Results
VARIABLES

(1) Will Refugees
Increase Terrorism?

(2) Is ISIS a Major
Threat?

(3) Are Refugees a
Major Threat?

Immigration Rate

-0.119
(0.7648)

-0.000784
(0.0340)

-0.291***
(0.0574)

Incidents per 100

-0.0184
(0.0478)

-0.000220
(0.0212)

0.0311
(0.0359)

Deaths per 100

-0.165*
(0.0845)

0.0559
(0.0376)

-0.0947
(0.0634)

Ideology

0.134***
(0.00768)

0.0295***
(0.00385)

0.116***
(0.00591)

Male

0.120***
(0.0198)

-0.0688***
(0.00993)

0.0116
(0.0153)

Age

0.00281***
(0.000632)

0.00270***
(0.000316)

0.00181***
(0.000485)

Family Size

0.000672
(0.00845)

0.00335
(0.00423)

-6.98e-05
(0.00651)

Constant

0.800***
(0.152)

1.545***
(0.0689)

1.272***
(0.115)

Observations

8,706

8,852

8,817

Number of groups

10

10

10

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Terrorist incidents had a much weaker effect on changing public opinion (Figure
2). Regardless of the number of incidents, belief that ISIS is a major threat remained
consistently high; the regression showed virtually no increase or decrease whatsoever. Similarly, attitudes about refugees increasing terrorism hardly fluctuated. An
increase of incidents per 100 only decreased negative opinion by an insignificant
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0.0184 units on the 1 to 7 scale. Incidents had nearly the same impact on feelings
toward refugees, increasing negative attitudes by only 0.0311 units, showing neither
substantive nor statistical significance. In short, incidents proved to have very little
effect on public opinion whatsoever.

behind these European attitudes? To better explore our theory on the impacts of political
ideology on opinions about terrorism, we ran six more mixed-model regressions to analyze if ideology, when interacted with immigration and incidents, has a higher impact on
public opinion. The results are shown in Table 2.

Figure 1.

Table 2.

Figure 2.

Ideology and Refugees’ Increase of Terrorism

Our initial results above proved consistent with our aforementioned theory.
Supporting our proposed hypotheses, neither immigration nor incidents alone were
a reliable predictor in public opinion on refugees and terrorism. Clearly, these two
variables by themselves are poor indicators of public opinion on terroristic threat in EU
countries. Furthermore, in each of the three models we ran, we observe a consistently significant variable: ideology. For each outcome variable, an increase toward conservative
ideology increases public fear of immigration and terrorism. Upon seeing this result,
we doubled down on our analysis of the possibility of political explanations for variance in EU civilian public opinion. Could conservative ideology be the explanatory factor
44

Our main findings purport that not only does ideology raise negative public
opinion on terrorism but that an increase of ideology and immigration combined
increases negative public opinion at a statistically significant level. Indeed, the effect
of increased immigration depends on the ideology of each participant. For liberals,
increased immigration does not raise public fear, whereas among conservatives, it
does. For each increase of immigration rate interacted with increasing conservatism,
we anticipate with 99 percent confidence a 0.0283 unit increase (on a scale of 1 to
7) in the belief that refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism. Although small,
it is significant, indicating a strong influence from conservative thought. In addition,
this interaction causes the immigration rate on its own to decrease negative public
opinion at the 95 percent level. Additionally, the interaction between ideology and
incidents proves to significantly increase negative attitudes toward the likelihood of
refugees bringing terrorism at the 90 percent level. For every one-unit shift in ideology paired with a 100-incident increase, we predict a 0.0089 increase in negative
perceptions. Although not substantive, this result shows that a large enough terrorist
attack could indeed begin to sway opinion based on individual ideology. Conservative ideologies are indeed related to EU members’ fear of refugees bringing terrorism,
particularly in cases of high terrorist activity. In all, more conservative individuals are
45
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Figure 5.

more likely to believe refugees will bring terrorism with them, particularly as immigration and incidents in their countries increase (see Figure 3).

Figure 3.

Ideology as an Indicator

Ideology and Threat of ISIS and Refugees

The interactions between ideology, immigration, and incidents (respectively)
continue to hold statistical significance among our two sub-outcome measures as
well. For the variable on fearing the threat of ISIS, both immigration and incidents
combined with increasing ideology expand this negative public opinion at the 95
percent confidence level. Ideology interacted with immigration and incidents has an
even greater impact on negative public opinion, indicating a statistical significance
of 99 percent. Again, these interactions hint at differences, though they are not substantive. Figure 4 highlights the distinctions between these two outcome measures as
ideology becomes more conservative. Again, conservative ideology increases negative
public opinion of ISIS and refugees, especially when combined with high immigration rates and large amounts of terrorist activity.

Figure 4.
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Clearly, ideology has a strong correlation with all three of our public opinion
measures, particularly when combined with high levels of immigration and large
amounts of terrorist incidents. Naturally, more liberal citizens are favorable toward
immigration and refugees. Conservative constituencies, in comparison, tend to be
less open toward immigration and the influence of refugees, perhaps due to concerns
over security. Our initial theory on the impact of immigration and incidents is confirmed under our statistical testing, as political beliefs begin to shine a light on how
these factors still play a part in shaping opinions of EU citizenry. Without a doubt,
politics influence public opinion in much stronger ways than we initially considered.
Regardless of current trends, such as rate of immigration and total number of terrorist incidents, ideology is by far the greatest predictor of individual feelings on how
immigration impacts terrorism.

Implications and Conclusion

Supporting our hypotheses, immigration rates and terrorist incidents do not, on
their own, explain or predict public opinion on refugees and terrorism. However,
when interacted with political ideology, both of these variables become statistically
significant. These results make logical sense: Extremely political issues like terrorism and immigration are undoubtedly interpreted differently depending on personal
political beliefs.
These findings have relevant applications. Policy-makers pushing a proimmigration agenda should not focus their efforts on addressing nationwide
levels of immigration in EU countries but rather target more conservative communities within each state. Improving the opinions of conservative citizens about
immigration’s overall impact on terrorism (or lack thereof) will be the most effective
way to improve overall public opinion. While it is true that some nations, such as
the UK and Sweden, have overall higher public opinion than others like Hungary
and Poland, it is also true that all of these countries have liberal and conservative
citizenry. With a greater understanding of public opinion on immigration and terrorism,
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counter-terrorism efforts and immigration policy can be better shaped to create a better
environment for all European nations.
As such, there is still much to be explored. Significant terrorist events in the EU
have passed since 2016, such as the radical Islamist that drove into a crowd of pedestrians
at Westminster Bridge in London or the massive bomb that killed twenty-two people at
the 2017 Ariana Grande concert in Manchester (Macguire 2017). Additionally, nationalist movements like Brexit have transpired since the last public opinion survey. As our
results indicate a definite relationship with political ideology, it would be both interesting
and important to our topic to see how movements like that in the UK influence public
attitudes on the liberal issue of immigration. The best data for this research would be the
2017 or 2018 Pew Research Spring Global Attitudes Survey, but as Pew won’t release this
information for two years after collection, other avenues of data should be explored.
Overall, we conclude that public opinion appears to be founded less on hard data,
such as immigration rates and number of incidents, and rather built upon preconceived
political ideologies. As more right-winged movements are currently sweeping the
developed world, our issue is increasingly salient. Better understanding of how ideology impacts public perceptions help inform better solutions to decrease the problems
surrounding immigration, refugees, and modern-day terrorism.
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